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Our immediate observations must be supplemented with contextual information to resolve
ambiguities. However, the context is often ambiguous too, and thus it should be inferred itself
to guide behavior. Here, we introduce a novel hierarchical task (airplane task) in which
participants should infer a higher-level, contextual variable to inform probabilistic inference
about a hidden dependent variable at a lower level. By controlling the reliability of past
sensory evidence through varying the sample size of the observations, we find that humans
estimate the reliability of the context and combine it with current sensory uncertainty to
inform their confidence reports. Behavior closely follows inference by probabilistic message
passing between latent variables across hierarchical state representations. Commonly
reported inferential fallacies, such as sample size insensitivity, are not present, and neither
did participants appear to rely on simple heuristics. Our results reveal uncertainty-sensitive
integration of information at different hierarchical levels and temporal scales.
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As sensory evidence is inherently ambiguous, it needs to beintegrated with contextual information to minimize theuncertainty of our perception of the world and thus allow
for successful behavior. Suppose that we observe just a few pas-
sengers exiting an airplane at an airport whose city hosts a soccer
final. If we find that four of them are supporters of the red team
and two support the blue team, we might conclude that there
were more supporters of the red team in the airplane. This
inference, based on incomplete sensory evidence, can be
improved by contextual information. For instance, there might be
many more blue than red supporters in the world. Then, despite
our initial observation, we might want to revise our inference and
rather conclude, based on the context, that the airplane carried
more blue than red supporters.
While in the previous example context was certain and by itself
able to resolve observational ambiguity, contextual information is
very often ambiguous. For instance, we might just know that
there is an event in the city that attracts more of a certain type of
people, but we do not know which type. Extending our example,
we would first need to infer the context (whether the event
attracts more people of the red or blue type) by observing samples
of passengers leaving several airplanes. By using the inferred
context, we can better estimate whether the next plane carries
more of one type of people given only on a small sample of its
passengers. Thus, in real-life, both observations and context
commonly provide incomplete information about a behaviorally
relevant latent variable. In these cases, inference should be based
on probabilistic representations of both observational and con-
textual information1–6.
Indeed, recent work has shown that humans can track a con-
textual binary variable embedded in noise that partially informs
about what specific actions need to be performed to obtain
reward7. Additionally, humans can infer the transition probability
between two stimuli where the transition probability itself
undergoes unexpected changes, defining a partially observable
context8. These results and other studies suggest that a refined
form of uncertainty representation is held at several hierarchical
levels by the brain9–14. However, in this previous research, the
reliability of the context has rarely been manipulated directly and
independently15 from the reliability of the current observation1,7,8.
Therefore, it is unclear up to what degree contextual inference
reflects its uncertainty and interacts with the inferred reliability of
the current observation as it would be expected from representing
it with a joint probability distribution over both observations and
context. While some effects predicted by hierarchical probabilistic
inference have been previously reported in isolation, no study has
—to our knowledge—thoroughly assessed a body of behavioral
predictions of hierarchical probabilistic inference and tested them
against alternative heuristics model.
To address the above question, we developed a reliability-based
hierarchical integration task that allows us to directly control
reliability in order to evidence characteristic patterns of prob-
abilistic inference. Our task was intuitively framed to our parti-
cipants using the analogy of flight arrivals to an airport whose city
hosts an event, rather than relying on an abstract or mathematical
description of the dependencies between the latent variables. The
goal was to decide whether the flight just landed carried more
passengers of the red or blue type based on the observation of
only a small sample of passengers leaving the airplane, and to
report the confidence in that decision. However, as the event is
known to tend to attract more of either of the two types of
passengers, knowledge of this context, if inferred correctly, would
be useful to solve the task. The crucial ingredient of our task is
that inference of the context is based on the observation of small
samples of passengers exiting previously arrived planes, making
the context partially, but not fully, observable. By manipulating
both the tendency and the sample size, we can control the
reliability of previous observations upon which inference about
the context should be based. Overall, this task structure creates
hierarchical dependencies among latent variables that should be
resolved by bottom-up (inferring the context from previous
observations) and top-down message passing (inferring the cur-
rent state by combining current observations with the inferred
context)6.
We find that participants can track and use the inferred
reliability of previous observations suggesting that they build a
probabilistic representation of the context. The inferred context is
integrated with the current observations to guide decisions and
confidence judgments about the value of a latent variable at a
lower hierarchical level. Decision confidence is found to closely
correspond to the actual accuracy of making correct decisions. As
a clear signature of probabilistic inference over the context, we
find that the sample size of previous observations is used by our
participants to infer the reliability of the context. This in turn has
a strong effect on decision confidence of a lower-level variable
that depends on the context. The observed behavior in our par-
ticipants eludes previously reported biases in judgments and
decision making16, such as sample size insensitivity17–19, and also
resists explanations based on simpler heuristics20,21. Overall, all
the reported effects in both tasks are consistent, quantitatively
and qualitatively, with the optimal inference model. Thus, our
results support the view that humans may form mental repre-
sentations akin to hierarchical graphs22 that support reliability-
based inference to guide confidence estimates of our decisions.
Results
The airplane task probes inference of latent variable. We
designed two experiments to test whether humans can use the
reliability of contextual information to guide decisions and con-
fidence judgments about a latent variable at a lower hierarchical
level. While in some previous studies, instructions to the parti-
cipants were quite abstract and often appealed to mathematical
terms21, here we attempted to facilitate understanding of the
complex relationships of the task variables by instructing parti-
cipants in intuitive and naturalistic terms. Thus, we described the
task to our participants by using the analogy of airplanes arriving
at an airport whose unknown passenger proportions were to be
estimated. In the first experiment (Experiment 1), the context is
neutral and stable across all the trials encompassing the session,
while in the second experiment (Experiment 2) context varies
across blocks of a few trials but remains constant within each
block. We instructed our participants that the context consists of
a tendency of the encountered airplanes to carry more passengers
of either of the two types. Formally, Experiment 1 corresponds to
the classical urn problem with unknown fractions of red and blue
balls, and Experiment 2 corresponds to a hierarchical extension
where the urns are themselves correlated and partially observable
(see Methods). As no feedback was given that instructed our
participants how they ought to make their confidence reports,
the experiments probe their internal capacity to estimate
uncertainties.
The effects of sample size on confidence reports. In Experiment
1, participants were told that the airplanes arriving to an airport
carry both blue- and red-type passengers, in an unknown pro-
portion, and that these proportions would be uncorrelated from
one plane to the next. Thus, in this case, no context was assumed
that would make our participants believe that the passenger
proportions across consecutives planes would be interdependent.
After observing a small sample of passengers randomly exiting
the plane, displayed as red and blue filled circles on the screen
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(Fig. 1a, first frame), participants were asked to report both
whether the airplane carried more blue or red passengers, i.e., its
passenger majority, and their confidence in this decision by
moving a line along a horizontal bar (second frame). Importantly,
there was no direct feedback about normative confidence reports:
participants received a binary feedback after each response, i.e.,
whether they correctly identified the latent passenger majority. In
addition, indirect feedback was provided at regular pauses every
five trials through some aggregated performance score based on
the ideal observer which was solely intended to maintain our
participants engaged in the task. While such feedback could in
principle be marginally used to adapt one’s responses, partici-
pants did not seem to modify their responses accordingly: first,
feedback was hardly indicative of the optimal policy (see Meth-
ods); second, participants performed the task well from trial one
and did not improve over time (see Supplementary Fig. 6a).
An ideal observer (Fig. 1b) should infer a distribution over an
airplane’s proportion of blue (or, equivalently, red) passengers
based on the observed proportion of blue passengers and the
sample size. The proportion of blue samples (passengers), called
“sample proportion”, is computed as NB/N, where NB (NR) is the
number of observed blue (red) passengers, respectively, and N=
NB +NR is the sample size. The inferred distribution over
passenger proportions concentrates around passenger propor-
tions suggested by the sample (Fig. 1b, green vertical line)17, and
its width reduces the larger the sample size is. The decision
whether the majority is blue or red is uniquely based on the
proportion of blue samples, but the confidence report should be
based on both the sample proportion and the sample size.
Specifically, in this example, decision confidence of the ideal
observer is the belief that the majority is blue, which equals the
area under the distribution summing up the probability of all
possible blue passenger proportions that are larger than one
half23,24 (Fig. 1c, d). The result is that confidence in a blue
majority increases with sample size because the distribution is
more concentrated around the observed proportion of blue
passengers. More generally, a central feature of probabilistic
inference is sample size dependence, which here magnifies the
confidence in the airplane majority that is suggested by the
sample proportion.
We tested whether human participants (n= 24) obeyed this
critical pattern or whether they neglected size17,19. Confidence in
a blue majority was found to increase with the proportion of blue
samples. As predicted, this increase was larger the larger the
sample size is (Pearson correlation, pooled across participants,
ρ= 0.31, p= 4.08 × 10−6) (Fig. 2a, b). These results were found
for most of our participants individually (21 out of 24;
permutation test, p < 0.05; Supplementary Fig. 2). Consistently,
confidence judgments were highly predictive of the probability
that the chosen majority was correct (Pearson correlation, ρ=
0.81, p= 1.27 × 10−45, see Supplementary Fig. 1 for details),
suggesting that participants performed the task well and gave
confidence reports that follow from an internal measure of
uncertainty.
To further confirm that sample size was an important feature
of our participants’ confidence reports, we performed a model
comparison in which we contrasted the optimal inference model
with two heuristic models, the ‘ratio’ and the ‘difference’ model.
The ratio model assumes that confidence is a function of the
sample proportion alone. This could be the result of a simpler
approach in which the population estimate is a point estimate
corresponding to the sample proportion which is a more suitable
approach in the limit of large samples that are representative of
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Fig. 1 Posterior-based confidence features sample size effects a Task: The colored dots (sample) represent two kinds of passengers (blue and red) that
disembarked a very large airplane. The participants are subsequently asked to report the confidence in their decision that the airplane carried more blue or
red passengers (blue majority) by horizontally moving the cursor line (orange). In this case, because the sample suggests a blue majority, the response
cursor should be on the right. b Sample size increases posterior-based confidence in a blue majority suggested by the blue majority of the sample.
Confidence (right) is computed as expected accuracy from the area under the curve for the inferred proportion (middle) from the observed sample (left).
Although the proportion of blue passengers (green line, middle) is the same for all three samples (rows), the inferred distribution depends on sample size.
The larger the confidence, the closer the response line on the previous panel should be to the rightmost border. c Confidence in blue majority
should increase with the proportion (%) of blue samples for all sample sizes, but it does so with a higher slope for larger sample sizes (color coded).
d Consequently, the slope parameter of fitted sigmoidal functions increases with sample size.
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based on the difference of blue and red samples, NB–NR. As the
ratio heuristic, this statistic is informative of decision correctness
but additionally covaries with sample size, as the ideal observer
model, but not directly through sample size. It would correspond
to the optimal model if the true proportion would only take two
possible values (e.g., 60% blue passengers or 40% blue
passengers), i.e. if subjects would discard the variability of the
true proportion within each of the two categories (see ‘Analytical
approximation for Experiment 1’ in Supplementary Methods). To
account for possible distortions on the response and/or calibra-
tions of heuristics estimators, all model estimates (either from the
optimal or heuristics models) were passed through a logistic
function that mapped the estimate onto the unity interval. The
logistic response mapping was fitted for each model and
participant individually (Methods).
The comparison between the optimal model and the ratio
model shows that the latter is clearly rejected because of its
incapacity to take sample size into account (Supplementary
Fig. 4). Even though the confidence estimates of the difference
model are sensitive to sample size, they typically do not
correspond to the notion of uncertainty that our participants
report: the difference model predicts a linear relationship between
the sample size and the slope of the confidence curve, while
subjects displayed a clear sublinear relationship (see Supplemen-
tary Fig. 3). We can thus dissociate the experimental reports from
these simple but covariant heuristics and conclude that the
response patterns of our participants suggest a probabilistic
inference approach. Moreover, as the difference model (corre-
sponding to the optimal response when the variability of true
proportion is discarded) can be ruled out, our results suggest that
our participants’ inference process incorporated not only
uncertainty about the passenger majority on the plane (blue or
red) but also about its magnitude (the proportion).
Reliability-based hierarchical integration of ideal observer. In
Experiment 2, participants were told that several airplanes with
unknown passenger proportions would arrive at an airport, as
before, but that consecutive airplanes would feature correlated
passenger proportions because of an event in the city that attracts
more travelers of one type. Thus, if the sample of a previous
airplane is highly suggestive of a blue airplane proportion, then
the participant could not only infer that this previous airplane
carries a blue majority, but also that the next airplane is more
likely to carry a blue majority, even before observing a sample of
passengers leaving it. Importantly, in Experiment 2, there was no
feedback about decision correctness of each trial’s airplane
majority, only an overall score after each block (see Methods and
Supplementary Fig. 6b). Inference of an ideal observer in our task
should start with inference of the current context (whether there
is a tendency to observe passengers from airplanes with blue or
red majorities). Next, this contextual information should be
integrated with the current sample to report confidence and
decide whether the current airplane it is more likely to hold a red
or blue majority (Fig. 3).
Thus, the generative structure of the observations that were
shown to the participants is hierarchical, with a higher-level
variable that determines the context for a block of always five
trials, which either favors red or blue airplane majorities, and
which in turn generates airplane majorities at the lower
hierarchical level across the sequence of trials in the block
(Fig. 3a). Both hierarchical levels feature hidden variables that are
not observable by the participants. From the generated airplane
proportions, samples are drawn, which correspond to the actual
observations of the participants (Fig. 3b). Note that the generative
process is purely top-down, from the context (high-level hidden
variable) to airplane passenger proportions (low-level hidden
variables) and then to the samples (observables). However,
inference by the ideal observer should first run bottom-up from
previously observed samples to infer the value of the contextual
variable (Fig. 3c; open nodes) and then top-down from this
inferred context (bottom open node) to the variable representing
the passenger proportion of the current airplane (orange node).
For the ideal observer, this can be formulated as message passing
between the hidden variables (Methods). It is worth emphasizing
that the task is about inferring the passenger majority of the
current airplane, at the lower hierarchical level, rather than asking
for the context. Note also that, in contrast to change-point
detection paradigms25 subjects were explicitly told that a new
context had to be inferred at the beginning of each block.
As with Experiment 1, we studied how an ideal observer would
behave under specific manipulations of the reliability of the
currently observed sample through its sample size and the
reliability of the context as controlled by the sample size of
previously observed airplanes. As with the previous experiment,
we first point to patterns of behavior that should be indicative of
reliability-based probabilistic inference in our hierarchical task.
First, we expect that confidence in blue majority of the current
airplane grows with the proportion of blue samples (Fig. 4a), as in
the previous task. However, in addition, we also expect that
confidence in a blue majority should be higher in blocks whose
actual tendency favors blue airplane majorities, which is indeed
the pattern that an ideal observer would show (Fig. 4a). This is
because, averaged across trials, the ideal observer can infer what
the block tendency is, which on average should be aligned to the
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Fig. 2 Human confidence estimates vary with sample size as predicted by probabilistic inference. a Confidence in a blue majority increases with the
proportion of blue samples (solid lines), and it does so more steeply the larger the sample size is (color coded). Optimal model is represented in light
colors. b The slope of the confidence curve in a increases with sample size. Participants feature a quantitatively similar increase as the optimal model (solid
line). Error bars indicate SEM across participants.
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Second, averaged across sample proportions and samples sizes,
confidence in a blue (red) majority in the current airplane should
increase the higher the inferred tendency of blue (red) passengers
is. Because of the symmetry across these two cases, we defined a
(block-) aligned confidence to indicate the confidence in the
direction (passenger type) that is aligned to the actual block
tendency and pooled the results across these two cases. For the
ideal observer, aligned confidence increases with the aligned
inferred tendency (Fig. 4b). In other words, the inferred context
informs inference of the current airplane’s proportion to the
degree that the context is reliable itself.
Sample size of the current observation should play a very
important role in modulating decision confidence as it indicates
increased reliability of the sample relative to the prior. Indeed,
aligned confidence increases with the aligned sample proportion,
and it does so with a higher slope when sample size is large
(Fig. 4c). Similarly, if the context is inferred probabilistically, the
reliability of previous trials should be taken into account. As a
consequence, the sample size of the previous observation should
modulate aligned confidence (Fig. 4d). For instance, if the
previous sample was large and suggested a red majority, then
confidence in a red majority in the current trial should be larger.
Another pattern that is expected from the ideal observer is that
the weights (see Methods) of all previous trials in a block onto the
confidence in the current trial should be constant (Fig. 4e),
because an earlier trial provides the same evidence for the context
as a recent one, on average across blocks. Finally, the more trials
have been observed in the block, the better the inference about
the current context ought to be. Thus, on average across blocks,
aligned confidence should increase with the number of previous
observations which indicates accumulation of evidence for the
contextual variable (Fig. 4f).
It is important to emphasize that these patterns correspond to
predictions of the ideal observer model. They will be used as a
benchmark for a direct comparison to behavioral data without
fitting any parameters. Consequently, we do not expect a perfect
match in terms of absolute values, but we would expect similar
patterns of variation if participants follow a probabilistic
inference strategy.
Human behavior follows patterns of probabilistic inference.
We first tested whether human participants can infer and use
contextual reliability by studying whether they followed the pat-
terns described above. We found that our participants’ confidence
in a blue majority increased with the proportion of blue samples,
but that confidence in a blue majority was larger when the block
favored airplanes with blue majorities as opposed to red majo-

























Fig. 3 Schematic of the hierarchical structure for learning empirical priors Participants are told that across a block of five trials (1, 2,…T≤ 5) they will see
passengers from five different airplanes arriving to the same airport. As before, they are asked to report their decision confidence whether the current
airplane carried more red or blue passengers. The schematic illustrates the hypothetical examples of an ideal observer that estimates confidence based on
the proportion of blue samples of the current airplane T and on the samples observed in previous trials. The generative model of the observations is as
follows. a Within a block of five trials, the context, called block tendency, is first selected, which corresponds to choosing either a positively (magenta) or
negatively (cyan) skewed distribution over airplane proportions. This context (distribution) is maintained throughout the block of five trials, but on each
trial a new blue majority (blue-red horizontal bars indicating the passenger proportion in each airplane) is randomly sampled from that distribution. In the
example, the context favors airplanes of red majorities. b Sample generation given the airplane majority is the same as for the previous task. c The internal
representation of the agent (orange background) mirrors the dependence structure in the environment (green background). Probabilistic inference is
performed by message passing between the nodes which internally represent the inferred block tendency and the airplane’s passenger proportion of each
trial (see Methods). Previous trials (t < T) provide evidence about the block tendency through the messages mt(b). They are probabilistically integrated into
an overall belief about the block tendency M(b) which provides top-down constraints on the inference of a new airplane’s blue proportion (orange node).
The confidence in a blue majority of the current airplane T held by the ideal observer (response bar, right) should follow from both the current sample
proportion and the inferred block tendency from previous samples.
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relied on the current sample to infer the current airplane
majority, but that they also inferred the context and used it to
modulate their confidence judgments.
Further evidence for this result comes from the observation
that aligned confidence increases with the strength of the inferred
tendency aligned to the block as computed by the ideal observer,
indicating that the more evidence was collected for a given block’s
tendency, the larger the modulation on the confidence reported in
the current trial was. The gradual increase (which was also
present at an individual level, Supplementary Fig. 8a) shows how
nuanced the representation of the contextual variable is as there is
no thresholding nor any sign of categorical representation. This
shows that the contextual variable—for which we never explicitly
asked—is represented in a graded manner, as it would be
expected from a probabilistic agent. Our participants not only
followed this pattern qualitatively, but they also seemed to adhere
quite closely to the quantitative, parameter-free, predictions made
by an ideal observer (Fig. 5b; Pearson correlation on binned
values, pooled across participants, ρ= 0.77, p= 5.13 × 10−33),
except for the fact that contextual information did not affect
predicted confidence as much as when contextual information
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Fig. 4 Characteristic behavioral patterns of probabilistic inference in the hierarchical inference task a Confidence in a blue majority of the current airplane
(current trial) should increase with the proportion of blue samples, as in the previous task, but in addition confidence should be larger in a block that favors
blue majorities (cyan) than in a block favoring red majorities (magenta). b Information of the block tendency should gradually increase the confidence in
the corresponding trial majority. Thus, responses can be pooled with respect to the real block tendency. We refer to it as ‘aligned confidence’ and use the
same concept for other relative quantities below. c Confidence in the aligned airplane majority increases with the aligned sample proportion. This
modulation is stronger for larger sample sizes (green) compared to smaller ones (orange) while it has no effect for an indifferent sample (50% sample
proportion, crossing point between the two lines). d Likewise, aligned confidence increases with the aligned sample proportion of the preceding trial and is
modulated by its respective sample size. e The influence of all previous trials, determined by the weights of a regression analysis, should be equal on
average (e.g., trials 1–2 on trial 3, T3). However, it decreases with the number of previous trials due to normalization. f Aligned confidence increases across
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Fig. 5 Inferred block tendency affects confidence reports. a Confidence in blue majority is higher when the block tendency favors blue majorities (cyan)
than when it favors red majorities (magenta). Experimental results (data points) are shown along with optimal behavior (solid lines), indicating an
integration of sample information with a learned belief about the block tendency. b Aligned confidence (black) increases with the optimally inferred belief
about the block tendency and is a close correlate of the optimal response (red), suggesting that participants internally track a graded belief based on
previously available evidence. Error bars indicate SEM across participants.
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participant by participant basis (one-sided signed rank on fitted
slopes, p= 0.004). Thus, even though the inferred tendency is
subjective to the participant, the correlation with the inferred
tendency of the ideal observer shows that participants must be
tracking a similar quantity.
Next, we studied how reliability governs hierarchical informa-
tion integration (see Fig. 4c, d). Both the current sample and
previous samples should be relied upon more strongly when their
reliabilities, controlled by sample size, are high. We first
confirmed that the slope of the confidence curve increases with
sample size of the current observation (Fig. 6a; Pearson
correlation of slope with sample size, pooled across participants,
ρ= 0.49, p= 8.67 × 10−14), indicating that participants used the
reliability of the current observation to form confidence estimates,
as in the previous task without hierarchical dependencies (see
Fig. 2b).
Beyond the finding above that participants learn the block
tendency (Fig. 5a), they should use it selectively and rely more
strongly on the sample compared to prior information when
sample evidence is reliable (Fig. 6b, pattern: Fig. 4c). Indeed, the
modulation with the aligned sample proportion is stronger for
larger sample sizes and leads to the crossover of the two
conditional curves (signed difference of conditional slopes from
linear regression, signed rank test across participants, p= 1.44 ×
10−5). On average across trials, prior information increases
aligned confidence (Fig. 6b). Relative to this offset, behavior is less
strongly driven by smaller samples because they provide less
information so that the agent resorts more closely to the
top–down expectations gained from previous trials.
Direct control of the reliability through sample size allows us to
study whether the inferred reliability of the context interacts with
the reliability of the current observation to inform confidence
judgments. Using this degree of freedom, we tested whether
participants used the reliability of the previously observed sample.
We found that, consistent with the pattern predicted by the ideal
observer, aligned confidence increased with the aligned sample
proportion of the previous sample and that this increase was
larger the larger its corresponding sample size was (Fig. 6c;
signed-rank test for positive difference of linear regression slopes
across participants, p= 0.002; see also dependence on previous
message mt-1(b) Supplementary Fig. 8b).
A central prediction of the probabilistic model is that all
previous trials should have equal influence on behavior on
average across blocks (see Fig. 4e, f). We determined their
influence from a regression analysis on the confidence judgments
(see Methods) and found a rather balanced influence of all
previous trials (Fig. 7a). Accordingly, no significant trend could
be evidenced through another linear regression analysis in which
the previous trial index is used to predict the average weight of
the previous trial on the aligned confidence (regression on the
means across participants, separately for current trials position 3,
4, and 5: p-values 0.41–0.89 for trials with 2–4 previous trials
respectively). Apparently, there are no signatures of temporally
selective evidence integration for the contextual variable such as a
confirmatory bias, which is characterized by an insufficient belief
revision once a belief has been established. If it were present, later
trials would be expected to have a lower influence here.
Probabilistic inference on the other hand, never fully collapses
onto one specific interpretation and hence never excludes
evidence for competing hypotheses. Similarly, this rather
balanced weighting is also inconsistent with some sort of leaky
prior integration scheme in which evidence presented long ago is
fading from memory. In agreement with these findings, evidence
for the block tendency, and thus also aligned confidence,
increases over the trials within a block (Fig. 7b). A linear
regression analysis of aligned confidence as a function of the
aligned trial index clearly shows the expected increase (regression
on means across participants, p= 8.68 × 10−9). Overall, hier-
archical integration offers a parsimonious explanation for context
integration which does not require explicit memorization of
previous samples after they are integrated into the context-level
variable.
Interestingly, the most obvious quantitative departure from the
expected patterns was that human participants appear to rely less
on contextual information as the observed effects of previous
trials were smaller than the predictions from the ideal observer.
For instance, the effect of previous trials on aligned confidence is
weaker (see e.g., Fig. 7a) but does not depend on how long ago the
information was acquired. Further support for such an insensi-
tivity to prior information is provided by trials in which an ideal
observer would e.g., estimate a red majority despite more blue
samples because of a high prior belief in a red tendency. We
found that most participants make these evidence-opposing
choices (see Methods, one-sided signed rank test with respect to
non-hierarchical ratio model with realistic response noise, p=
0.007; Supplementary Fig. 5b). There is however a tendency to
stay on the side of the category boundary that is suggested by the
momentary evidence, as they make significantly fewer opposing
choices than the optimal model (one-sided signed rank test, p=
0.008).
Finally, we tested whether this relative insensitivity to prior
information could be explained by mismatching assumptions
about the magnitude of the block tendency which we modeled
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Fig. 6 Sample size effects reveal reliability-based information integration. a As in the basic task (Fig. 2b), the slope (data points) of the confidence curves
over the sample proportion increases with sample size and tightly follows the optimal pattern (solid line). b The modulation of aligned confidence with the
aligned sample proportion of the current trial is larger when the sample size is high (green) than when it is low (orange). Significant signed differences of a
bin-wise one-sided signed rank test are indicated, *0.01 < p≤ 0.05, **p≤ 0.01. c The modulation of aligned confidence with the aligned sample proportion
of the previous trial is larger when the sample size of the previous trial is high (green) than when it is low (orange), similar to the previous panel. Error bars
indicate SEM across participants in a–c.
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the red and blue contexts (see Fig. 3a). In fact, some behavioral
biases, such as confidence under- and overestimation26, can be
partly explained by choosing (structurally) mismatched prob-
ability distributions for the task at hand27,28. To test this
possibility, we used a model that allowed for a differently skewed
distribution implementing this block tendency (see Methods) and
compared it to the ideal observer model. To correct for other
distortions, both models used an additional mapping onto the
final response. We found that the model with the mismatched
block tendency almost perfectly described the patterns of
probabilistic inference (Fig. 8; exceedance probability p ≈ 1, for
patterns see Supplementary Fig. 7) and that participants appear to
subjectively assume a weaker block tendency as evidenced by the
expectation value of the skewed Beta-distribution used to model a
blue block tendency (optimal 0.61, median across participants
0.55, one-sided signed rank test for difference, p= 1.68 × 10−4).
This suggests that qualitative differences arise from a mismatch
between the experimental and the assumed skewed distributions
by the participants.
Model comparison favors probabilistic inference of context.
The previous analysis has shown that behavior adheres to the
main features of probabilistic inference in a reliability-based
hierarchical task. We have seen that these patterns were quali-
tatively reproduced by the optimal model without the fitting of
free parameters, and that a simple extension of the ideal observer
model largely improved the qualitative fits of the patterns.
To go beyond qualitative patterns of behavior and provide a
more quantitative account of the results and the adherence of
behavior to reliability-based hierarchical inference, we fitted the
ideal observer estimate of the contextual variable to behavior and
compared it to simpler heuristic estimates that do not rely on
probabilistic inference. These simpler models assumed specific
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Fig. 7 Behavior reflects hierarchical evidence integration across trials. a On average across blocks, all previous trials provide the same information about the
block tendency irrespective of their temporal distance to the current trial. From top to bottom, trials number 3–5 of each block are predicted from the
indicated previous trials (sample proportion). Participants show a balanced weighting despite smaller weights compared to the ideal observer model (red).
b Participants accumulate evidence about the block tendency in a gradual fashion. Aligned confidence increases over trials within a block despite a smaller
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Fig. 8 Patterns for fitted block tendency. Behavioral patterns in the hierarchical inference task (Experiment 2) compared to a fitted model assuming a
mismatched block tendency and a sigmoidal response mapping accounting for distortions on the response. The fits of this model closely reproduce the
patterns produced by participants. Error bars indicate SEM across participants.
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from the optimal computations, as follows (contextual variable
M=M(b) in Fig. 3; see Methods).
In the ‘averaging’ model we assume that the estimate of the
contextual variable M equals the presented percentages of
previous trials in a block and thus neglects sample size. In the
‘tally’ model we assume that the estimate of the contextual
variable M equals the ratio between the total number of blue
samples observed so far in all previous trials within a block over
the number of all red and blue samples observed within a block
so far. This is similar to pooling the samples of all trials, as if they
were drawn from a common population. Thus, as larger samples
contribute more points, this model is sensitive to sample size, but
in a different way than the ideal observer model. Finally, in the
‘difference’ model, contextual information is a sigmoidal
function of the running average of the differences between the
number of blue and red samples in all previous trials. All these
models only differ in how they estimate the contextual variable
M. To introduce as few constraints as possible on the integration
of M with the current sample (NB/N,N) and to compute the final
response, we used a flexible generalization Eq. (14) of the
sigmoidal response mapping Eq. (13), attempting to reduce noise
for model comparison. Even though all three heuristic
approaches are close correlates of the optimally estimated
contextual variable, we found that the three models were inferior
to the probabilistic strategy of the ideal observer model
(Supplementary Fig. 3).
Beyond quantitative comparisons, heuristic models also failed
to quantitatively reproduce the defining features of subject
behavior. Specifically, participants’ responses were influenced by
the proportion of blue passengers in previous trials of the block,
and that influence increased with trial position in the block as
subjects accumulated evidence about current context across
trials (Supplementary Fig. 10). Such feature was seen in the
optimal model. By contrast, in all three heuristics models, the
influence of the proportion of blue passengers in previous trials
remained constant across the block, as in these heuristics models
evidence about the current context is averaged and not
accumulated across trials (see Eqs. 9–11; Supplementary
Fig. 10c-e). Moreover, the ‘averaging’ model was, by construc-
tion, insensitive to the sample size of previous trials, unlike our
participants (Supplementary Fig. 10b).
Discussion
One important question is whether humans can hold probabil-
istic representations of contextual variables and use them to
improve inference of lower-level variables by providing suitable
constraints on their possible values. Here, we report that humans
can perform reliability-based hierarchical inference in a task in
which they have to report their decision confidence about the
value of a lower-level variable that is constrained by a higher-
level, partially observable variable. We controlled evidence by
using reliability cues in the form of sample size, giving us enough
leverage to test the identified patterns of hierarchical probabilistic
inference. The similarity between observed and probabilistic
inference patterns of behavior, the strong dependence of con-
fidence on currently and previously observed samples sizes, and a
model comparison between optimal and heuristic models, sup-
ports the notion that humans can mentally hold and update
ubiquitous representations of uncertainty over structured
knowledge representations such as graphs22.
A large body of research has addressed the question whether,
and under what conditions, humans can perform probabilistic
inference, typically, by using perceptual tasks10,29,30. More
recently, the usage of confidence reports has opened a window to
more directly examine how uncertainty is handled in internal
models that humans use while they perform a task8,23,28,31,32.
However, most of this work has focused on simple inference
problems in which the value of a hidden variable has to be esti-
mated based on noisy evidence24,33,34, without any hierarchical
structure. In contrast, even visual processing in normal condi-
tions should rely on hierarchical schemes where hidden variables
at higher levels constrain the values of partially observed variables
at lower levels35. Hierarchical representations allow to exploit
inferential constraints by learning them from experience with
related situations by exploiting abstract similarities through
contextual variables. Such joint inference over structured prob-
ability distributions is a crucial ingredient for theories such as
predictive coding3,6,36. However, whether human inferences rely
on ubiquitous probabilistic representations across a hierarchy of
variables is largely unknown.
Addressing this important question requires the ability to
independently control the reliability of higher-level and lower-
level variables to test, for instance, whether and how behaviorally
reported confidence is modulated by them. If reliability cues
produce modulations of confidence reports in accordance with
theoretically predicted patterns, then such observations would
constitute evidence in favor of mental representations similar to
probabilistic graphical models. Previous work has studied per-
ception and decision making in similar hierarchical schemes like
ours1,7,8,15, but it has been difficult to independently modulate
the reliability at both higher and lower hierarchical levels. For
example, when using stimulus duration and stimulus strength as
an indirect proxy to control reliability15, the way these manip-
ulations affect reliability depends on the specifics of the sensory
system and sensory noise. In our task, uncertainty emerged not
from sensory noise but from a hidden cause for stochastically
generated stimuli, and the reliability of both levels could be
controlled directly and independently through sample size, thus
providing an objective measure of trial-to-trial reliability inde-
pendent of the sensory system. Our task revealed that humans
modulate their confidence not only based on the reliability of the
currently observed sample, but also on the inferred reliability of
the context which is itself a function of previous samples. Spe-
cifically, we have found strong dependencies of confidence on the
sample size of current and previous observations, and these
dependencies adhered to the predicted trends and patterns of
hierarchical probabilistic inference. Dependencies on previous
observations emerged only based on the distribution of previous
stimuli, without any trial-to-trial external feedback that could be
used to modulate the priors. In summary, while previous studies
had already shown in isolation sample size sensitivity37 and some
form of hierarchical probabilistic reasoning1,7,8,15, here the con-
junction of both phenomena and the very detailed correspon-
dence between human and optimal behaviors builds strong
evidence for ubiquitous reliability-based integration of hier-
archical information, even without extensive prior training on
the task.
It is possible that our participants did not truly hold prob-
abilistic uncertainty representations over a mental graphical
representation across multiple levels, but that they rather used
very sophisticated heuristics that we were not able to characterize.
However, estimating uncertainty about latent variables is a par-
ticularly difficult problem for heuristic approaches just based on
point estimates that disregard the distributional format that the
estimate should take5, e.g., that several airplane proportions are
consistent with a given sample. In our task, for instance, learning
calibrated confidence reports would require repeated exposure to
the same sample together with supervising feedback about the
actual latent variable (airplane majority). Even for very simple
problems, the scarcity of such data makes this frequentist
approach to uncertainty estimation practically difficult and thus
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un-ecological. As we did not provide supervising feedback, our
participants presumably held accurate internal trial-by-trial
representations of uncertainty38,39. Although we cannot com-
pletely rule out the use of non-probabilistic or heuristic shortcuts,
the main patterns of probabilistic inference have been fulfilled by
our participants. Their generalizations are hard to conceive
without relying on an internal generative model of the observa-
tions. This is in line with previous studies (e.g.,40,41) which
conclude that human inferences are model-based or use internal
simulations42.
One clear limitation of our study is that it shows that humans
can use reliability-based hierarchical integration of evidence, but
it does not speak to the circumstances when this occurs. In
particular, our results contrast with a vast literature that has
reported deviations from the norms of rational inference in
human judgments such as sample size insensitivity17,19,43. One
important methodological difference between this previous work
and ours is that behavioral economics has typically dealt with
situations that have been conveyed using mathematical terms21.
We speculate that the success of our participants in ‘under-
standing’ the hierarchical structure of the task is the result of the
way the task has been framed and communicated. We put par-
ticipants in an imaginary yet intuitive setting of arrivals to an
airport whose city hosts an event and refrained from using terms
such as “urns” or “correlations”, which mathematically define our
task on an abstract level. Evidently, this approach was successful
in at least two respects. First, the task structure is clearly com-
municated so that participants make roughly correct assumptions
for inference. Second, our participants managed to interrogate
cognitive systems that are capable of probabilistic inference14.
Interestingly, a recent proposal has suggested that intuitive tasks
that sidestep high demands on working memory and natural
language may improve performance44. The existence of such
framing effects45 onto the algorithmic nature of perceptual
inference mechanisms should be tested in a future experiment. A
related but slightly different hypothesis is that probabilistic
inference would be shaped during lifetime experience by repeated
exposure to choices between options that require integration
between sources of varying reliability. In the lab, such probabil-
istic inference process would only be applied if the task bears
some similarity with the problems already encountered by the
subjects in their life. In support of such hypothesis, a recent study
did find sample size sensitivity in how subjects updated product
evaluation by learning about previous consumers’ ratings37,
which is a highly familiar task routinely performed in everyone’s
everyday life.
However, our work has also revealed some differences between
optimal and observed behavior. Most strikingly, we have found
evidence that top-down information is relied upon less strongly
relative to information from the specific instances of the sam-
ple28. Such a tendency to discount prior information is indeed
reminiscent of the biases that emerge when the representativeness
heuristic is used16,17. However, as we have shown with a model
that assumes a different block tendency (Fig. 8), all these differ-
ences could be attributed to mismatched assumptions about the
prior distribution of the context. In general, when comparing
behavior against normative approaches, the interpretation of
deviations should consider as much as possible the internal
assumptions, constraints and motivations that the participant
obeys46,47. Accounting for such differences might be crucial to
interpret and possibly account for many cognitive biases27,48.
Beyond these differences in the central inference stage, there
could be alternative sources of distortions in the conversion from
the estimate into a motor report. Taking into account such
distortions allowed to capture some other part of the departure
of our participants’ behavior to the optimal observer
(Supplementary Fig. 1). By contrast, our participants behavior
was found to be little affected by numerosity or other forms of
sensory noise (see ‘Sensory noise’ in Supplementary Methods).
The easiness with which our participants seemed to perform
probabilistic inference over the mental representation of a
graphical model at several levels of a hierarchy should not distract
us from the computational difficulty of the inference
process. Typically, probabilistic inference even in simpler tasks
involves complex operations such as normalization and
marginalization5,49,50. Interestingly, inference in our task can be
considerably facilitated if the conditional independence properties
between variables are exploited. In this case, the distribution
factorizes so that only local computations (marginalization) need
to be performed whose results can be passed on as messages.
Hence, the graphical structure of the model facilitates inference
which may even be implemented with recurrent neural
populations51.
Apart from the tractability of the computations, we must bear
in mind that the goal of the participant is not necessarily pure
inference, but the maximization of some subjective cost-benefit
measure52. Further research is needed to test what constitutes the
main challenges to probabilistic inference for humans such as
imposing adequate structural constraints that leverage contextual
knowledge or the use of tractable approximations due to limited
cognitive resources.
In sum, we have developed a novel reliability-based hier-
archical task based on which we found that humans are sensitive
to the reliability of both high- and low-level variables. Our results
reveal uncertainty-sensitive integration of information in hier-
archical state representations and suggest that humans can hold
mental representations similar to probabilistic graphical models
where top-down and bottom-up messages can inform behavio-
rally relevant variables.
Methods
Participants. All participants were invited to complete three sessions on different
days within three consecutive weeks. The sessions were targeted to take about 35
min (Session 1) and 45 min (Sessions 2,3). In total 25 participants (15 female, 10
male) were recruited mainly among students from the Pompeu Fabra University in
Barcelona. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Department
(CIREP approval #0031). We excluded data from one participant that did not
complete the experiment. The median age was 25 (minimum 20, maximum 43).
We accepted all healthy adults with normal or corrected to normal vision. We
obtained written confirmation of informed consent to the conditions and the
payment modalities of the task. Irrespective of their performance, they were paid 5
€ for session 1 and 7 € for sessions 2 and 3.
Additionally, they had the chance to obtain a bonus payment which was
determined by the mean of their final score after removing the worst trials (2.3%).
The score S= 1− |y− yopt| of a response y was computed based on the proximity
to the optimal confidence report yopt (see below for details of the optimal model in
both experiments). As such, the overall score reflected the ability of the subject to
correctly infer the probability that the observed stimuli would be sampled from one
category or the other. The payment was determined by comparison to an array of
five thresholds that were set according to the {0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9} cumulative
quantiles of the empirical score distribution across prior participants. A higher
score S corresponds to a better performance so that participants were payed an
additional bonus of {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} € if their final score was higher or equal to the
quantile thresholds. This is a way of rewarding their efforts to optimize their
responses.
Written task instruction explained that we would score their responses with
respect to the chances that their decision would be correct and that bonus
payments would be based on that score. Additionally, they were informed that their
score was to be compared to the other participants and that the experimenter could
monitor their behavior on-line via a second screen from outside.
Stimuli & responses. The task was presented on an LCD screen with a computer
running Matlab Psychtoolbox 3.0.12. Immediately after trial onset, our participants
were shown the sample consisting of red and blue solid circles arranged on a two-
dimensional grid about the screen center (Fig. 1a). The only feature that dis-
tinguished the sampled passengers was the dot color that we chose to be either blue
or red. Because the positions of the dots are communicated not to be informative,
the sample is completely summarized by the sufficient statistics. We tried to make
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the number of dots (sufficient statistics in our task) easily perceptible while making
their locations appear as random as possible. Adequate grid spacing was introduced
to prevent the circles from overlapping. Furthermore, we kept red and blue samples
separate along the horizontal direction (details in SI).
The display is static until the participant makes a response by clicking the USB-
mouse which clears the display of the sample. After a short delay of 300 ms, the
program shows a centered horizontally elongated response bar of random
horizontal extent with a vertical line marking its center. In addition, the response
cursor (Fig. 1a, orange vertical line) is shown at a random and uniformly
distributed initial horizontal position along the response bar. Participants can
adjust the horizontal position of the response cursor by moving the mouse
horizontally and confirm the input with a click to report their choice about the
airplane’s passenger majority and their subjective confidence in its correctness. The
movement range of the response cursor was bounded to the horizontal extent of
the response bar. The raw response is linearly mapped onto an interval between
[0,1] and interpreted as the confidence in a blue trial majority y. Consequently, the
corresponding quantity for the confidence in a red majority is 1− y.
Experiment 1: Procedure & instructions. First, participants read detailed written
instructions of the task. We introduced the task metaphor that relates to judging
the (hidden) majority of passengers on a flight and used it to explain the mathe-
matical assumptions in more intuitive terms (see Supplementary Methods).
Additionally, our participants were given 30 trials to familiarize with the
handling of the task. The subsequent experimental session (session 1) consisted of
280 trials with pauses together with feedback after every 5 trials. The sample sizes N
were independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples from {3, 5, 7,…, 13}
while the hidden airplanes’ passenger proportions μ were i.i.d. samples from a Beta
(4,4) distribution. Then, the number of blue passengers of the sample is determined
by a draw from a Binomial distribution NB ~ Bin(N,μ). After each trial, the
participant receives feedback about the correctness of his decision (whether the
cursor was placed on the side corresponding to the underlying passenger majority)
but no supervising feedback regarding his confidence estimate. In addition, a two
second time-out was presented for incorrect decisions which is signaled by a
horizontal ‘progress bar’ which linearly diminishes over time indicating the fraction
of the waiting time left. During time-out, there is nothing a participant can do to
proceed but wait. In principle, the correctness feedback could be used by
participants to learn the mapping from stimuli to the probability of selecting the
correct category. In practice however, subject behavior was found to be very stable
from the first test trial and throughout the session (Supplementary Fig. 6).
Every five trials, a pause screen was shown which provided information about
how many out of all trials had already been completed. To motivate engagement in
the task, we gave motivational feedback as an average hSi of the score S (distance to
optimal observer, see above) over the last 5 trials since the last pause. Such feedback
was uninformative as to how subjects should change their behavior to improve
their score: Because it averaged performance over 5 trials, it was very unlikely they
could use to learn current mappings and shape future responses (see stability of
participants behavior Supplementary Fig. 6). Additionally, they also received a
time-out of a few seconds proportional to 1 hSi. The overall rationale behind the
time-out was to more strongly incentivize task engagement and prevent click-
through.
Experiment 2: Generative model for the stimuli. In Experiment 2, trials of one
block are tied together because they depend on a common unobserved variable
selecting the context. There were two possible contexts: one biased towards red
passengers, the other towards blue passengers. To keep the notation simple below,
we use the same variable names for the generative process (Fig. 3a) as for the ideal
observer (Fig. 3c), although in general, an agent’s representation is not necessarily
the same as the generative process in the environment. First and once for every
block, the binary variable b governing the prevalence for either red (b= 0) or blue
(b= 1) passenger majorities in the airplanes, called block tendency, is drawn from
a Bernoulli distribution b~ Bernoulli(0.5). Then for every trial, the unobserved
proportion of blue passengers of the airplane μ is drawn from a mixture of two Beta
distributions depending on the block tendency b.
p μjν1; ν2; bð Þ ¼ b  Beta μjv1; v2ð Þ þ 1 bð Þ  Beta μjv2; v1ð Þ : ð1Þ
The Beta distribution is parameterized by two parameters (v1= 14, v2= 9),
chosen such that the resulting distribution over the passenger proportion μ is
skewed. By convention, Beta μt jv1; v2
 
is negatively skewed (v1≥ v2) and models a
blue block tendency. The greater the expectation v1/(v1+ v2) ≈ 0.609 the more
extreme this effect because more airplanes with a majority of blue passengers (μ >
0.5) as opposed to red passengers (μ < 0.5) will be encountered.
Once the block tendency b has been selected in a block, sampling of the
observed passengers in the following 5 trials within a block proceeded as in
Experiment 1. First, the sample size N is determined by an i.i.d. drawn from a
uniform categorical distribution Cat Nj1=n; ¼ ; 1=nð Þ over all n sample sizes
N 2 f3; ¼ ; 11g. Then, the number of blue passengers of the sample is determined
by a draw from a Binomial distribution NB ~ Bin(N, μ). Hence, the distribution for
each of the 5 trials within a block is
p NB;N; μjν1; ν2; bð Þ / Bin NBjN; μð Þ  Cat Nj1=n; ¼ ; 1=nð Þ  p μjν1; ν2; bð Þ : ð2Þ
The geometric placement on the screen is not considered to be part of
the generative model as we assume that only the sufficient statistics matter.
The expression in Eq. (2) defines the probability distribution for the sufficient
statistics of the observations of trial t to which we refer more concisely by
pðqt ;Nt ; μt jb; ν1; ν2Þ, thus equivalently expressing it in terms of each trial’s sample
proportion q ¼ NB=ðNB þ NRÞ of the number of blue (NB) and red (NR)
passengers, and the sample size N=NB+NR. We drop the conditioning on the
parameters of the categorical distribution over sample sizes to keep the notation
uncluttered. Using this expression, the entire sampling distribution over all
variables of all trials within a block is:
pðq1; ¼ ; q5;N1; ¼ ;N5; μ1; ¼ ; μ5; bjν1; ν2Þ ¼ p bð Þ
Q5
t¼1
pðqt ;Nt ; μt jb; ν1; ν2Þ :
ð3Þ
Note that given the block tendency b, the per-trial quantities, such as μt, are
conditionally independent.
Experiment 2: Procedure & Instructions. Experiment 2 comprises the sessions 2
and 3 and was carried out with the same 25 participants as in Experiment 1
(session 1). Despite the hierarchical extension across blocks of five trials, the
handling of the task and the presentation of the sample is virtually the same. The
changes to the latent structure should lead to a different interpretation of the
information which we attempted to convey by an extension of the task metaphor
(see Supplementary Methods) and written task instructions.
As for Experiment 1 and prior to starting session 2, participants completed two
very short training sessions. First, they were given 20 trials (4 blocks) with a strong
and visually obvious block tendency (sample sizes f8; ¼ ; 11g, block tendency
Beta(15,7)). Then another 30 trials under slightly harder conditions (sample sizes
f3; ¼ ; 11g, block tendency Beta(15,7)). Importantly, this only permits them to
understand the structure of the reasoning task, such as the dependence between the
variables, and get familiarized with the task environment in increasingly difficult
conditions. We intentionally provided as little information as possible as to how
they should respond. The important point was to make clear what the structure of
the process was that generated the samples. Thus, we did not monitor their
performance, nor give them any feedback about how specifically they should place
the response cursor. They could, however, ask the experimenter to clarify the
assumptions behind the task. We proceeded to the actual experimental session
when our participants reported that they had ‘understood’ the task. The above-
mentioned procedure was clear enough to achieve that, and yet sparse enough not
to reveal the normative response strategy against which we wanted to compare
their behavior.
After familiarizing, our participants completed 270 trials of the experimental
session 2 with an even more difficult setting of the parameters (sample sizes
f3; ¼ ; 11g, block tendency Beta(14,9)). On the third session, on a different
appointment, the participants just continued the instructed task of session 2 for 300
trials with identical settings to obtain more data.
In Experiment 2 and different from Experiment 1, no feedback nor time-out
was provided after each trial. However, as in Experiment 1, every five trials, i.e.,
after each block in Experiment 2, participants were presented with a pause screen
with a score based on the results of the last block and a time-out of a few seconds
proportional to 1 hSi. As described before, the purpose was mainly to engage
participants with the task. That they may have used this extremely sparse and
indirect information to somehow guide future responses in Experiment 2, seems
even more unlikely than in Experiment 1 as participants already showed no signs of
converging to the normative strategy over time there (Supplementary Fig. 6b)
where the task was less complex than in Experiment 2 with several hidden
variables.
Ideal observer for Experiment 1. The ideal observer model is assumed to know
the actual generative process of the observations. Based on the observed passengers,
it infers the most likely airplane proportion. Due to the choice of a conjugate prior
distribution p(μ) for the Binomial probabilistic model NB ~ Bin(N, μ) above, pos-
terior inference yields a Beta-distribution over the latent airplane proportion μ.
Specifically, to give calibrated responses, i.e., confidence estimates that correspond
to the actual odds of making correct decisions, the prior distribution used for
inference must correspond to the actual base rates specified by Betaðμj4; 4Þ. The
confidence in e.g., a blue trial majority c(B) of an ideal observer can be expressed as
the belief that choosing a blue majority is correct by integrating over the corre-
sponding subspace23 of inferred blue majorities.
c Bð Þ ¼ 1 cðRÞ ¼ p μ> 0:5jNB;NRð Þ ¼
R1
0:5
BetaðμjNB þ 4;NR þ 4Þdμ ð4Þ
Heuristic models for experiment 1. Here we describe two heuristic models that
humans could use to estimate the probability of blue passenger majority on the
airplane.
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1. Ratio model
In the ratio model, the response is simply mapped from the proportion of
blue passengers in the sample NB/(NB+NR)
c Bð Þ ¼ σð2NB=ðNB þ NRÞ  1Þ
where σ is a sigmoid function with possible distortions that provides output
in the [0 1] range (see below).
2. Difference model
In the ratio model, the response is mapped from the difference between the
number of blue and red passengers in the sample NB−NR. Again the difference is
mapped onto the [0 1] range using a sigmoid with possible distortions:
c Bð Þ ¼ σ ðNB  NRÞð
Distorted reports of internal confidence estimates. Apart from inference,
behavior may be influenced by extraneous factors, e.g., due to motor control
constraints. We accounted for those by a nonlinear transformation of the con-
fidence estimate c 2 ½0; 1 onto our model’s prediction of the response ŷ.
First, we standardize the output c0 ¼ 2ðc 0:5Þ which then enters the argument
of a logistic sigmoid function through the polynomial Z ¼ ω0 þ ω1c0 þ ω2c03.
ŷ ¼ 11þ expðZÞ ð5Þ
As we assume symmetry, only odd powers of c0 are used. In other words, the
distorted confidence estimate ŷ should lead to the same decision confidence
regardless of whether the estimated majority is blue or red.
This function is flexible and able to approximate a wide range of distorted
reports including the identity mapping and various forms of probability
distortion53,54. It only accounts jointly for all effects which affect the final
judgment. Other systematic deviations during confidence estimation which are
conditional on a subset of the input space can only be partially accounted for, e.g.,
deviations for extreme values of the sample proportion.
Ideal observer for Experiment 2. The ideal observer model (see Fig. 3c) we
describe here makes use of the generative process described in the main text and
Fig. 3a, b. It updates a probability distribution over the observations of all in-block
trials and their respective latent variables ðμ1; ¼ ; μT Þ up to the current trial T. The
parameters (v1,v2) defining the block tendency are part of the generative structure
and assumed to be known. Consequently, inference amounts to an updating of the
distribution over the latent variables through a calculation of the posterior dis-
tribution conditional on the observations (We identify the distributions by their
respective arguments and e.g., write p(D|μ) for the distribution over the sufficient
statistics of the sample. We often use the abbreviation D= (q,N) for the observa-
tions, omitting parameters and index according to in-block trials t) as
p μ1; ¼ ; μT ; bjD1; ¼ ;DT
  / pðbÞ QT
t¼1
pðDt jμtÞpðμt jbÞ ð6Þ
The current trial is labeled T, and p(b) is the prior probability for block type b
(p(b= 0)= p(b= 1)= 0.5). Note that the probability distributions related to one
block are independent to observations from previous blocks: in contrast to change-
detection task paradigms, the model has explicit knowledge of when a new context
start, and does not have to infer it. We checked in a control analysis that responses
were only influenced by response in the same block but were not contaminated by
responses in the previous block (Supplementary Fig. 9). This showed that subjects
indeed incorporated the block structure into their inference process. The same
knowledge was incorporated into heuristics models (see below) as well.
We would like to compute the probability of a blue latent trial majority, namely
that μT is larger than 0.5. For this purpose, all variables relating to previous trials
which are not of interest must be integrated out.
p μT  0:5jD1; ¼ ;DT



















The constant ψ ensures normalization and can be recovered analytically as
shown below. Because of conditional independence given the block tendency b, the
high-dimensional distribution factorizes so that only one-dimensional integrals
over the latent variables of previous trials must be performed. Examining the graph
structure (see Fig. 3), we see that they may be considered messages mt(b) which are
passed upwards to update the block-level variable b.








For proper normalization ψmt, they are themselves probability distributions that
convey bottom-up evidence for the block tendency variable b= {0, 1} based on the
observations Dt= (qt, Nt) . These bottom-up messages from previous trials within a
block are integrated to update the belief MT(b) about the block tendency b prior to
trial t through point-wise multiplication and proper renormalization ψM.




As more evidence is gathered (trials), more factors can be absorbed into the
belief about b without having to store data from all previous trials independently as
it is efficiently encoded in MT(b). Subsequently, this knowledge serves as top-down
constraint on future inferences on the trial level. Consequently, to derive the
probability of a blue trial majority on the current trial, the integration of
momentary evidence (Eq. (6)) can be expressed as
p μT  0:5jD1; ¼ ;DT












Proper normalization for the constants ψ, ψM and ψmt can be obtained analytically
(see Supplementary Methods).
Heuristic models to estimate the block tendency. Here we describe three
heuristic models that humans could use to estimate the block tendency.
1. Averaging model
The computation of the optimal estimate of a blue block tendency from
previous trials, MT in Eq. (9), requires marginalization over hidden variables
and normalization, which could be computationally difficult. Instead,
participants could resort to approximations or heuristics. For the first
model, the heuristic averaging model, we assume that the estimate of a blue
block tendency (b= 1) is approximated by computing the average of the
presented fractions of blue samples qt ¼ NBt=ðNBt þ NRtÞ in the trials t
prior to the current trial T (T ≥ 2).




This estimate neglects sample size and corresponds to the implicit assumption
that the inferred airplane’s passenger proportion of each trial is well captured
by a point estimate, i.e., by its respective sample proportion17. The model gives
the same weight to each trial and thus ignores the fact that some trials provide
more information than others due to different sample sizes. As for the other
models below, indifference is assumed on the first trial MavgT¼1 b ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ 0:5.
The way the heuristics top-down message MavgT is integrated into the
confidence estimation process is described below (see Flexible mapping
capturing current and prior information integration).
2. Tally model
Similarly, this model computes a tally of all blue samples observed prior to the
current trial T versus the number of all samples observed in a block so far.





This corresponds to pooling the samples of all trials, as if they were drawn
from a common population of unknown population proportion.
3. Difference model
The heuristic difference model considers the difference between the number of
blue and red samples dt ¼ NBt  NRt in every observed trial t within a block as
informative to establish a belief about the block tendency. Across trials, it is
accumulated by computing (T ≥ 2):
MdT ðb ¼ 1;ωÞ ¼ 11þexpðωPT1
t¼1 dt=ðT1ÞÞ
ð13Þ
The logistic sigmoidal function ensures that the result always takes a value
between zero and one and that it can be interpreted as a proper belief, as in the
previous two approximations. The parameter ω adjusts the sensitivity to the
sample-difference statistics dt and can be determined by a fit to behavioral data.
Flexible mapping capturing hierarchical integration. This is a more flexible
extension of the response mapping described before that can be used for the
hierarchical learning task (Experiment 2). More concretely, we want to integrate
any given prior belief M, not necessarily derived from a probabilistic model, with
the momentary sample D= (q, N) and map it onto the modeled response
q;N;Mð Þ7!ŷ. As a mere function approximator, it is agnostic to the mechanisms
that participants may use to combine information. Correspondingly, its parameters
ω must be determined by a fit to the experimental data. Here, this process is
approximated by a polynomial function Z of the input (q,N,M) that is fed into a
logistic sigmoid as in Eq. (5).
Z ¼ ω1 þ ω2q0 þ ω3q0N þ ω4M þ ω5q03 þ ω6q03N þ ω7NM0 þ ω8M03 þ ω9NM03
ð14Þ
The argument Z contains only odd powers of q and M because we assume
symmetry and no preference for estimating either red/blue majorities.
Correspondingly, both quantities are standardized beforehand by the mapping
x0 ¼ 2ðx  0:5Þ. As they are also independent from one another, no corresponding
product terms are included.
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Preliminary testing revealed that the inclusion of nonlinear terms is
important to capture finer-grained patterns of behavior. The sample size N is
introduced into some terms to model its magnifying effect for the signed
quantities (q, M). We performed a weight normalization by the SD of each
polynomial (for the input data) which was absorbed into the indicated weights ω.
The particular choice of the terms in Eq. (14) balances flexibility with model
complexity (and optimization for scarce behavioral data). We manually tested
different parameterizations but did not find crucial differences for other
reasonable choices of the mapping.
Response distribution. We assume that the probability of obtaining the behavioral
confidence report yt on trial t conditional on the data dt and the model parameters
is a Gaussian distribution truncated to the interval from zero to one N½0;1 yt jŷt ; θð Þ.
The mean parameter of the normal distribution is set to the model prediction ŷt .
The latter is denoted by ŷ to distinguish it from the response y of the participant
which is formally represented by a draw from the response distribution to account
for task-intrinsic behavioral variability beyond the variations captured by the
model. The standard deviation (SD) parameter θ of the Gaussian is assumed to be
constant and robustly estimated from the data (see Supplementary Methods).
When analyzing the patterns of behavior produced by a fitted model (either a
heuristic model or the optimal model with distortions), we computed the expected
value of the mode under the truncated gaussian noise. Because of such truncated
noise, the expected value is more centered than the noiseless model prediction:
yt jŷt ; θh i ¼ ŷt þ θ
N αð Þ  N βð Þ
ϕ βð Þ  ϕ αð Þ
where α ¼ ŷt=θ and β ¼ ð1 ŷtÞ=θ
As our data might be contaminated by other processes such as lapses, we take
precaution against far outlying responses. The response likelihood is calculated for
all responses as
p yjd1; ¼ ; dTð Þ ¼
QT
t¼1
1 ϵð ÞN½0;1 yt jŷt ; θð Þ þ ϵ: ð15Þ
Additionally, to prevent isolated points from being assigned virtually zero
probability we generally add a small probability of ϵ ¼ 1:34 ´ 104 to all. This
corresponds to the probability of a point at four standard deviations from the
standard normal distribution. For non-outlying points this alteration is considered
negligible. To avoid singularity problems common to fitting mixture models, we
constrained the SD parameter θ to be larger than 0.01 during fitting.
Inferential patterns for fitted block tendency. The probabilistic model assumes
that the block tendency from which the trial-by-trial (airplane) proportions μ are
drawn is given by one of two skewed Beta-distributions (see Methods). By con-
vention a ‘blue’ (b= 1) context is characterized by the block tendency
Betaðμjν1 ¼ 14; ν2 ¼ 9Þ while the ‘red’ context (b= 0) is correspondingly denoted
by Betaðμjν2; ν1Þ. The two distributions are symmetric with respect to the block
aligned trial majorities, ~μb ¼ b  μþ ð1 bÞ  ð1 μÞ, which immediately follows
from the property of the Beta distribution: Betað~μb¼1jν1; ν2Þ ¼ Betað~μb¼0jν2; ν1Þ. A
variation of the optimal inference routine (Eqs. (7–9)) is used that allows for
different values of the parameters v1,v2 governing the block tendency with the
restriction that v1 ≥ v2. In addition, the sigmoidal response mapping (Eq. (13)) is
used to allow for nonlinear distortions of the output.
Estimating model evidence. The evidence that each participant’s data lends to
each model is derived from predictive performance in terms of the cross-validation
log likelihood (CVLL). For training, we maximized the logarithm of the response
likelihood (Eq. (15)). To maximize the chances of finding the global maximum
even for non-convex problems or shallow gradients, every training run first uses a
genetic algorithm and then refines its estimate with gradient based search
(MATLAB ga, fmincon). The CVLL for each participant and model is summarized
by the median of the logarithm of the response likelihood (Eq. (15)) on the test set
across all cross validation (CV) folds (SI).
Group level comparison. Instead of making the assumption that all participants
can be described by the same model, we use a hierarchical Bayesian model selection
method (BMS)55 that assigns probabilities to the models themselves. This way, we
assume that different participants may be described by different models. That is a
more suitable approach for group heterogeneity and outliers which are certainly
present in the data. The algorithm operates on the CVLL for each participant
ðp ¼ f1; ¼ ;PgÞ and each model ðm ¼ f1; ¼ ;MgÞ under consideration and
estimates a Dirichlet distribution Dirðrjα1; :::; αMÞ that acts as a prior for the
multinomial model switches upm. The latter are represented individually for each
subject by a draw from a multinomial distribution upm  Multð1; rÞ whose para-
meters are rm ¼ αm=ðα1 þ :::þ αMÞ. We use the CVLL and assume an unin-
formative Dirichlet prior a0= 1 on the model probabilities. Later, for model






corresponding to the belief that a given model is more likely to have generated the
data than any other model under consideration. High exceedance probabilities
indicate large differences on the group level. We consider values of pexc ≥
0.95 significant (marked with *) and values of pexc ≥ 0.99 very significant (marked
with **).
Regression for sample size dependence. Separate regression analyses conditional
on sample size N are used to determine the slope of the psychometric curves of the
confidence judgments in a blue trial majority over the sample proportion of blue
samples q (Figs. 1, 2, 6). For a given sample size N, we use a logistic sigmoid with a
linear weight ωN to relate the standardized sample proportion q0N ¼ 2ðqN  0:5Þ to
the modeled response ŷ.
ŷ ¼ 11þexp½ωN q0N  ð16Þ
We note that with this parameterization unbiased judgments are assumed.
Conditioning reduces the number of data points available for fitting. To avoid
numerical singularities (sigmoid collapses to step function) due to finite data, we
use the likelihood function (Eq. (15)) but with the truncated Gaussian replaced by a
Gaussian. This choice effectively leads to weighted regression assigning less
probability density to responses close to the extremes (e.g., a response of 1 is
assigned ½ of the density due to spill-over of the Gaussian into [1, ∞)). In this
(heuristic) scheme, outlying responses are given less importance which translates
into higher stability of the weight estimate.
Regression for previous trial weights. To estimate the weight on the
sample proportion of previously presented in-block trials on the current con-
fidence estimate we perform a regression analysis (see Figs. 4e and 7a). Prob-
abilistic integration of evidence for the block tendency M (Eq. (9)) results
in a nonlinear increase of aligned confidence with the number of previously
observed trials which saturates due to normalization. Hence, as the relative
contribution of each trial decreases as more trials are observed, we perform the





t¼1 ωt q0t 
ð17Þ
As before, we use a logistic sigmoid with a linear combination of standardized
sample proportion q0t ¼ 2ðqt  0:5Þ of each previous trial t to the modeled
response ŷ. Again, this conditioning reduces the number of data points available for
fitting (570/5= 114 trials) from which up to four weights have to be determined.
To avoid numerical singularities due to finite data, we use the likelihood function
(Eq. (15)) but with the truncated Gaussian replaced by a Gaussian (see above).
Evidence-opposing choices due to contradictory prior. Evidence-opposing
choices are a crucial prediction of the ideal observer model which occur when the
prior belief overrides contradictory evidence from the current sample. If we e.g.,
record a response that reports a blue majority while the sample majority is red, we
call this an evidence opposing choice (confidence judgment). This can be attributed
to an influence of an opposing prior belief or task-intrinsic response noise (input-
independent). To avoid biased estimates because of the latter, the analysis is
conditional on trials that on average provide opposing evidence to the sample. We
only used trials whose aligned sample proportion is smaller than 0.5 as it opposes
the tracked prior belief (on average).
Crucially, in Experiment 1, we found that noise basically does not lead to
evidence opposing choices (see Supplementary Methods). Nevertheless, we make a
conservative estimate by comparing behavior to a model whose evidence opposing
choices just result from noisy responses in the absence of any prior belief tracking.
This reference model ŷ ¼ ~qþ ϵ just reports the aligned sample proportion ~q plus
independent noise ε drawn from a truncated Gaussian distribution of standard
deviation SD= 0.1.
Binning for visualization and analyses. To impose minimal constraints on data
for visualization (see Figs. 5–7), we plotted the responses by grouping them into
approximately equally filled bins across participants. The number of bins was
manually chosen to achieve an appropriate trade-off between resolution and noise
of the estimated bins values. Importantly, this only affects visualization. Unless
stated otherwise, the underlying ungrouped data is used for testing. The condi-
tional curves in Figs. 6b, c were determined by the cumulative quantiles Q of the
sample size distribution (many ≥Q(0.6), few <Q(0.4)) and (many >Q(0.5), few ≤Q
(0.5)) respectively.
Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in
the Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
The data that support the findings of this study are available as Supplementary Data.
Code availability
The code for data analysis is available publicly at https://github.com/pschustek/
empirical_priors.
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